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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (1953 as
amended) which provides that the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over "orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original jurisdiction."
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment 11:
Suits against States: The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects or any Foreign State.
United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1:
Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States; and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, nor; shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 5
Section 5: The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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The Family Medical Leave Act. 29 ILS.C.S. § 2612(a)(1)(d)
1) ENTITLEMENT TO LEAVE.-Subject to section 103, an eligible employee
shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month
period for one or more of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to
care for such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care.
©) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform the functions of the position of such employee.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is the State of Utah immune, by virtue of the 11th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, from an action in the Utah State Courts filed pursuant to the "self-care"
provision of the Family Medical Leave Act. 29 U.S.C.S. § 2612(a)(1)(d)? The self care
provision is the section of the FMLA which provides leave "because of a serious health
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such
employee." Id. The actual issue before the Court in this case is whether Congress acted
pursuant to its authority to enforce the goals of the fourteenth amendment, in particular,
the goal of eliminating gender discrimination.
The issue presented by this appeal is a legal in nature and arises out of the United
States Constitution. Therefore, the district court decision is reviewed for correctness,
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without deference. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196
(Utah 1991).
This issue was directly addressed by the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss and
the Memorandum in Opposition filed by Nicholas. R. 38-46 and the oral argument on the
Motion to Dismiss. R. 118.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 27, 2005, Lynn Nicholas ("Nicholas"), by her attorney, filed a complaint
against her former employer, the Attorney General of the State of Utah.("Attorney
General") R. 1-10. The Complaint alleged that the Attorney General interfered with
Nicholas' rights granted by the Family Medical Leave Act when it placed obstacles in the
way of her return to work following leave designated as Family Medical Leave. Id. The
Attorney General filed an Answer followed by a Motion to Dismiss on basis of qualified
immunity. The issue was briefed and argued to the Court on February 13, 2006. R. 118.
On February 23, 2006, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and issued a
Memorandum Decision. R. 99-101. On March 30, 2006, the Court entered an order of
dismissal. R. 107. This appeal ensued.

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Ms. Nicholas was an Assistant Attorney General in the Office of the Utah
Attorney General. On February 7, 2004, Ms. Nicholas's daughter-in law, Karen Sclafani,
died unexpectedly following childbirth.1 R.2.
2. The child survived and Ms. Nicholas's son, Brian Maffley, was left to raise the
baby girl on his own. Id.
3. Following Ms. Sclafani's death, Ms. Nicholas was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder. R.3-4.
4. Over the next several months, Ms. Nicholas worked a reduced schedule and
took several leaves of absence to deal with her own illness and to support her son in his
efforts to overcome his grief and establish a life with his new child.2 R. 3-8.
5. The leaves were always classified by the Attorney General's Office as Family
Medical Leave. R. 4, 6-7.

1

The facts stated herein are from the Complaint. "When reviewing the propriety of
a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party." Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895 (Utah
2001).
2

Because Ms. Sclafani was not her daughter, and because her son was an adult,
Ms. Nicholas could only take leave under the self-care provision of the FMLA.
6

6. At the end of her leave, the Office of the Attorney General actively discouraged
Ms. Nicholas from coming back to work by placing numerous impediments in the way of
her return. R.7-9.
7. As a result of the stress associated with overcoming these impediments, and
frightened of returning to hostility in the workplace, Ms. Nicholas experienced a
deterioration of her condition and took disability retirement. R. 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it found that Congress had acted outside its authority
pursuant to the 11th Amendment of the United States constitution when it applied the selfcare provision of the Family Medical Leave Act to the States. The Act, by its language,
was intended to prevent discrimination in the granting of medical leave. At the time the
act was passed, Congress had evidence of a long history of gender discrimination
sufficient to conclude that federal legislation requiring a uniform, gender neutral policy
for personal medical leave was a necessary and legitimate use of its authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

7

ARGUMENT
I. CONGRESS ACTED WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT PASSED THE FMLA.
Beginning in 1890, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the 11th
amendment to the United States Constitution contains an implicit recognition of the States
sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890)."For over a
century now, we have made clear that the Constitution does not provide for federal
jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting states." Nevada Dep V of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977, 155 L.Ed 953, 958 (2003).
Congress does, however, have the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under some circumstances. "Congress my, however, abrogate such immunity in federal
court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute
and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. This authority arises out of the increased scope of Congressional power
granted by the constitutional amendments passed following the civil war.
But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section, Congress is
expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves
embody significant limitations on state authority. . . . We think that
Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the
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purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide
for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts.
Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.E.d 2nd 614 (1976).
In determining whether Congress has properly abrogated sovereign immunity, the
Supreme Court has developed a two part test. First; as indicated above, Congress must
make its intention to abrogate state immunity "unmistakably clear." Hibbs at 726. Second,
Congress must act pursuant to its expanded authority pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Congressional remedy must "exhibit congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end. Id at 728.
The self-care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act meets these tests.
II. CONGRESS EVIDENCED AN INTENTION TO BIND THE STATES TO SELFCARE THE PROVISIONS OF THE FMLA.
The self-care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act provides enforceable
rights against the State of Utah because it falls within the jurisdiction granted Congress by
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The FMLA constitutes an effort by
Congress to prevent personal or family illness from interfering with women's ability to
survive and flourish in the workplace.
In Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the United States
Supreme Court considered whether the Congress acted within its authority in applying the
9

Family Medical Leave Act to the States. The facts of the case involved an employee who
took leave pursuant to Section D of the Act which creates an entitlement to leave:
In order to care for the spouse, or a son or daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition.
29 U.S.C.S. § 2612(a)(l)c). In determining whether or not Congress had properly
abrogated Nevada's immunity, the Court determined that the statutory language
evidenced a clear intent to bind the States. This finding applies to all sections of the Act
including the provision before the Court today:3
Congress may, however, abrogate such immunity in federal court if it
makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute and act pursuant to a valid exercise of power under §5 of the
Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t . . . . The clarity of Congress's intent here is not
fairly debatable."
Hibbs at 726. The Act allows employees to seek damages against any employer in any
State or Federal Court and defines employer to include a "public agency." 29 U.S.C. S. §
2617(a)(2). Public Agency is then defined to include the government of a state and any
agency of a state. 29 U.S.C. S. § 261 l(4)(A)(iii). That Nicholas's claim meets this
standard is undisputed.

3

Ms. Nicholas' claim is that her employer, the Attorney General's office interfered with
her right to return to work following approved leave. This claim was brought pursuant to 29
U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) which states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter."
10

III. CONGRESS ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT
APPLIED THE SELF-CARE PROVISION OF THE FMLA TO THE STATES.
It is the second step of the sovereign immunity analysis which serves as the basis
for the dispute now before this Court.. In order for the self-care provision of the FMLA to
constitute a valid exercise of Congressional authority to bind the states, it must arise out
of congressional power to enforce the guarantees of the of 14th amendment. Congress
cited this authority in passing the FMLA but it is for the Court to determine whether that
exercise is constitutional. Hibbs at 727.
In determining that the family care provision of Hibbs was sufficiently tied to the
goals of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court noted that the provision was
intended to combat gender based discrimination, a valid exercise of Congressional power.
Id. at 729-730 ("The long and extensive history of sex discrimination prompted us to hold
that measures that differentiate on the basis of gender warrant heightened scrutiny; . . . the
persistence of such unconstitutional discrimination by the States justifies Congress'
passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation."). This Court should find the self-care provision
similarly consistent with the legitimate exercise of power by Congress.
As part of the FMLA, Congress stated its purpose as follows:
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote
the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in
preserving family integrity; (2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for
medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child,
spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition; (3) to accomplish the
purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in a manner that accommodates the
11

legitimate interests of employers; (4) to accomplish the purposes described in
paragraphs (1) and (2) in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the potential for
employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that
leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related
disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis; and (5) to
promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men, pursuant
to such clause.
29 U.S.C.S. § 2601(b). Emphasis added. Thus., Congress was clearly concerned with
gender discrimination in passage of both the self-care and family care provisions.
Following Hibbs, the Federal and State Courts that have considered whether States
are immune from the self-care provision have reached conflicting results. In its
memorandum decision, R. 99-100, the Court relied largely on the reasoning in Brockman
v. Dept. of Family Services, 342 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2003), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 1219
(2004), where the Court held that the ruling in Hibbs was limited to the family care
provision of the FMLA and that Congress overstepped its bounds in subjecting states to
jurisdiction as to the self-care provision of the Act. In Brockman, the Court found that the
self care provision of the FMLA was intended to prevent discrimination against sick
employees, not to prevent discrimination among them. Brockman at 1154-55. Thus, the
court found there was no overreaching fourteenth amendment justification sufficient to
support federal jurisdiction.
The Brockman decision has been cited and followed by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Touvellv. Ohio Department of Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
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422 F.3d 392 (6th Circuit 2005) and a federal District Court in Mississippi. Bryant v.
Mississippi State University, 329 F. Supp. 2nd 818 (N.D. Miss. 2004). Both cases rejected
any possibility that the self-care provision could serve to remedy gender discrimination
and found instead, to the extent that the Act protected women, the FMLA might actually
discourage employers from hiring women, by forcing the employers to provide leave to a
group they might suspect of abusing the policy.4
Brockman is underpinned by a decision not to consider the FMLA as a whole. The
reasoning by which Brockman gets to this conclusion is circular and should be rejected:
There is a colorable argument to the effect that the self-care provision of the
FMLA must be viewed as part of the Act as a whole, and that it would
therefore be a valid abrogation of states' sovereign immunity. We decline to
adopt that view here, because 'even with the heightened standard of review
for gender-based discrimination....we do not find that the legislative history
sufficiently ties the FMLA's personal medical leave provision to the
prevention of gender-based discrimination.' Moreover, 'there is no showing
. . .that establishes any nexus between gender-neutral medical leave for
one's own health conditions and the prevention of discrimination on the
basis of gender on the part of states as employers.'
Brockman atl 164-1165, emphasis in original, citations omitted. Thus, the Court found
that because the self-care provision does not act independently to remedy gender

4

Both Bryant and Touvell argue that there is no evidence in the record indicating a
need for the self-care provision as a remedy to gender discrimination. However, the
Supreme Court has not always required such a showing where there is a long
demonstrated history of discrimination. See, for example; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976) where the Court upheld Title VII against a sovereign immunity challenge
with no discussion of any Congressional findings on the subject of gender discrimination.
13

discrimination it cannot have the analytical benefit of being part of a statute which
otherwise has a demonstrable benefit with regard to gender discrimination in the
workplace.
The fallacy of that part of the Brockman analysis is demonstrated by the facts of
this case. Ms. Nicholas took several periods of leave during the early winter and spring of
2004 after her daughter-in-law's sudden death. Early on, her time off was for the mixed
purpose of helping her son grieve and care for his child, and to allow her time to grieve
and look after her health. By late spring and summer, Ms. Nicholas was given time off for
personal health reasons, in part as a result of the stress she shouldered both from her own
grief and from helping her son move on from his grief. Her physical and emotional illness
were directly related to her role as a care-giver. Thus, while the Tenth Circuit recognizes
that women have suffered on the job discrimination disproportionately as a result of their
roles as care-givers, the Court truncates any connection between that role and its effects
on the health of the care-giver. The facts of this case make plain that the separate
elements of the FMLA are inextricably intertwined.^
In Hibbs, the Court found:
It can hardly be doubted that.. .women still face pervasive, although at
times more subtle, discrimination. . . .in the job market. According to
evidence that was before Congress when it enacted the FMLA, States
continue to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the employment context,
specifically in the administration of leave benefits. . . . The long and

5

This argument was made before the Trial Court at R. 118, p. 11, 12.
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extensive history of sex discrimination prompted us to hold that measures
that differentiate on the basis of gender warrant heightened scrutiny; here,
as in Fitzpatrick, the persistence of such unconstitutional discrimination by
the States justifies Congress's passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation.
Hibbs, at 1978-1979
In Toeller v. Wisconsin, 296 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Wise. 2003), the District Court
considered whether there is a gender element sufficient in the "self-care" provision of the
FMLA to support federal jurisdiction.6 Specifically, rejecting the view espoused by
Brockman, the court found that the right of an employee to take time off for a serious
illness, although gender neutral, had the intended effect of preventing employers from
favoring men over women in employment. "[B]y creating the self-care provision,
Congress has attempted to preclude any incentive for an employer to hire a man over a
woman because, regardless of sex or family status, all eligible employees are entitled to
leave under the FMLA." Toeller at 949.
Moreover, the family care and childbirth provisions do not, in themselves, protect
women who may need leave associated with pregnancy rather than childbirth. The
childbirth provision of the Act does not provide leave, for example, for a pregnant woman

6

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the finding in Hibbs applies
with equal force to the self care provision and that sovereign immunity does not protect
state entities from lawsuits filed pursuant to the FMLA. Montgomery v. Maryland, 72
Fed. Appx, 17, 19 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Sovereign immunity does not protect the states in
FMLA actions.")(unpublished decision, included in the Addendum as Addendum C). The
Montgomery case, however, contains very little analysis of the issue and simply finds the
sovereign immunity issue moot as a result of Hibbs.

15

placed on bed-rest prior to the birth of a child. Equally important, the law requires
employers to provide equivalent leave to a woman whose health is sidelined for serious
illness related to her reproductive system as it gives to a man who has had a heart attack.
Thus, the self-care provision has the direct effect of preventing gender discrimination by
prohibiting an employer from acting with bias when deciding when and if to grant leave.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the Court should find that Congress was acting within its
authority and that State of Utah cannot avoid complying with its promises pursuant to the
FMLA by relying on its sovereign immunity.
Nicholas asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Court below and remand this
matter for further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/ /

day of Juh^006.

i R m WOODHEAD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ C G 2 $ ; ^
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAg
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SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
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LYNN NICHOLAS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

m

Case No. 050909664
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

ATTORNEY GENERAL - STATE OF UT,

Date: February 22, 2 006

Defendant
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 7. After considering the memoranda submitted by the parties, as well as holding oral argument,
the Court enters the following decision:
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Because this is a Motion to Dismiss, the facts are not in dispute. The only operable fact for purposes
of this motion is that Plaintiff has brought an action under 29 USC § 2615, which makes it unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, etc. an employee's exercise of his/her rights under the Family Medical Leave
Act ("FMLA"). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she attempted to exercise her rights to take leave pursuant
to 29 USC § 2612(a)(1)(D), which allows a individual to take leave because of a serious health condition
that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee, and that
Defendant interfered with her efforts. Defendant argues that, as a State agency, it is entitled to immunity
from such suits. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument.
This case turns on the application of Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003). In Hibbs, the court held, that the FMLA "creates a private right of action to seek both equitable
and money damages * against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction," should that employer 'interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights.
[The Court held] that employees of the State . . . may recover money damages in the event of the State's
failure to comply with the family-care provisions of the Act." Id. at 724 (internal citations omitted).
Defendant argues that the holding of Hibbs was specifically limited to the family-care provisions of the Act
and did not include the self-care provisions. Plaintiff disagrees and urges the Court to find that Hibbs
encompasses the whole Act and so the State's immunity from suit has been abrogated even for the self care
provisions.
The Court finds that the holding in Hibbs was specifically limited to the family-care provisions of
the FMLA and did not indicate that Congress has abrogated state immunity for suits brought under the selfcare provisions. This is supported by the plain language of Hibbs which provides that employees of the
State may recover money damages "in the event of the State's failure to comply with the family-care
provisions of the Act." If the court had wanted to include all the provisions of Act within its analysis, it
could have easily done so by referring broadly to the FMLA as a whole. It did not do so. This holding is
also supported by Brockman v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 342 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2003) and its

NICHOLAS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL

PAGE 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

progeny.
Although Plaintiff points to two cases, Toeller v. State ofWisconsin Department of Corrections, 296
F. Supp. 2d 946 (E.D.Wis. 2003) and Montgomery v. State of Maryland; Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services, 72 Fed. Appx. 17, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15068 (4th Cir. 2003), which hold that
Hibbs applies to the whole FMLA, the Court finds that they are not persuasive. Montgomery offers no
analysis for its holding and the analysis of Toeller is simply not convincing. Instead, the Court finds that
Brockman, et. al offers better analysis on this issue. In fact, Bryant v. Mississippi State University, 329 F.
Supp. 2d 818 (N.D.Miss. 2004) and Touvell v. Ohio Department of Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2005) specifically discuss Toeller and determine that Brockman is the
better-reasoned case. Without reiterating that analysis, the Court finds that Bryant and Touvell appropriately
discredited the analysis in Toeller. The Court, therefore, adopts the well-reasoned opinions of Brockman,
Bryant, and Touvell, and holds that Hibbs did not extend its holding to subsection (D) of 29 USC §
2612(a)(1).
Although, Hibbs did not extend to the self-care provisions of the FMLA, this Court can still find that
Congress validly abrogated State immunity from suit if Congress abrogated such immunity by making its
intention to abrogate "unmistakably clear in the language of the statutes and acts,? and if Congress acted
pursuant to valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the 14th Amendment. See Hibbs, 532 U.S. at 726. The
Court finds that Congress did not meet the requirements for abrogation. Although Congress clearly intended
to abrogate immunity {id. at 724), the Court finds that the self care provisions were not enacted pursuant
to a valid exercise of authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. Again, the Court adopts the
excellent analysis from Brockman, Bryant, and Touvell on this issue.
Because the State (and, by extension, the Attorney General) is immune from suits alleging money
damages brought under the self-care provisions of the FMLA, this action must be DISMISSED.
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The Court, having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, as well as holding
oral argument, entered a Memorandum Decision on February 22, 2006 granting the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Plaintiffs' Complaint
be, and hereby is, dismissed.
DATED this ^

day of March, 2006.
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CASE SUMMARY
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not covered under FMLA. Also, the employee's request for injunctive relief was based on
de minimis and unmeasurable parts of her new assignment to which the equivalency
requirement of 29 U.S.C.S. § 2614(a)(1)(A), (B) did not apply. The district court did not
err in failing to act on the employee's motion to amend because she failed to make a
written motion to amend, and her sentence at the end of a memorandum opposing a
motion to dismiss did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b).

OUTCOME: The court modified the district court's judgment to reflect that the complaint

was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim and affirmed the j u d g m e n t as
modified.
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PER CURIAM:

In 2000, Sheila K. Montgomery filed this action against the State of Maryland, the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and the Warden and Deputy Warden
at Eastern Correctional Institution, in their official and individual capacities, alleging claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA" or "the Act"), 29
U.S.C.A. 55 2601-2619 (West 1999 & S u p p . 2003). Although [ * * 2 ] Defendants withdrew
their assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district court dismissed both counts on
sovereign immunity grounds.
On appeal, the State reasserted its Eleventh Amendment immunity. This court held that the
E[ev_enth Amendment barred all claims against the State and the Department of Public
Safety, the Warden, and the Deputy Warden except the claim for reinstatement under the
FMLA against the individual administrators in their official capacities. That claim, we held,
was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
Montgomery v. Maryland, 266 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court granted Montgomery's petition for certiorari. The Court vacated our
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Lapides v. Board of Rejgents of
Univ. Svs. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 152 L Ed. 2d 806, 122 S. Ct. 1640 (2002). We
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of Lapides.
On remand, the district court concluded that Lapides did not affect its holding, and reinstated
its order dismissing the § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim and the [ * 1 9 ]
FMLA [ * * 3 ] claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The latter ruling was based on the
court's conclusion that the FMLA did not validly abrogate the State's sovereign immunity.
Montgomery appeals, raising issues only as to the FMLA claim. She therefore has abandoned
the § 1983 claim. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 2 3 1 , 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that H N I ?*Congress effectively abrogated the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity against causes of action based on the FMLA. Nevada
Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 7 2 1 , 155 L. Ed. 2d 953, 123 S. Ct. 1972
(2003). Thus, the issue of whether the State can waive the immunity and then withdraw the
waiver is moot in this case, as sovereign immunity does not protect the states in FMLA
actions. Unless the complaint is subject to dismissal on other grounds, we must remand the
case to the district court for consideration on the merits.
In our prior decision, we stated, "even if Montgomery's claim for damages could somehow
survive the sovereign immunity defense, dismissal would still be proper because she has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Montgomery, 266 F.3d at

341. [ * * 4 ] H W 2 ? A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
"after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiffs complaint as true and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiffs favor, it appears certain that
the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief."
Edwards v. City ofGoldsboro. 178 F.3d 2 3 1 , 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
Montgomery argues that, as the Supreme Court vacated that decision, our holding is not
binding. While that may be so, see Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52,
53-54, 72 L. Ed. 2d 668, 102 S. Ct. 2223 (1982), we are persuaded that our reasoning
remains valid.
HN3

?Damages under the FMLA are limited to lost or denied wages, salary, benefits, or other
compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 261_7(a)(l)(A)(i)(I). If there have been no such losses, damages
are limited to actual monetary losses such as the cost of care. § 2 6 1 7 ( a ) ( l ) ( A ) ( i ) ( I I ) .
Montgomery alleged no lost wages or cost of care, focusing instead on " " ^ e m o t i o n a l
distress, which, along with nominal and consequential damages, is not covered under
the [ * * 5 ] Act. See Walker v. United Parcel Sery., Inc., 240 F_.3d.1268, 1277 (10th Cir.
20Q1} (no actual damages suffered, no grounds for equitable relief; plaintiff sought only
nominal damages); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.. 193 F.3d 1274, 1284 (11th Cir.
1999) (plaintiff failed to show adverse employment action or damages; damages not
recoverable for mental distress); Nero_y^_IndustriaI[Molding Corp.4 167 F.3d 9 2 1 , 930_(5_th
Cir. 1999) (FMLA damages limited to lost salary or wages, employment benefits, or any other
compensation that shows quid pro quo between employer, employee—not out-of-pocket
expenses and damages for mental anguish); Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 728
(7th Cir. 1998) (inmate fired before FMLA leave scheduled suffered no damages recoverable
under the Act).
As to Montgomery's request for injunctive relief, we addressed this issue as well in our prior
decision and remain persuaded by that reasoning. H y V 5 ?Under the FMLA, an employer must
restore an employee to the same or an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay and
other conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. 5 2614 r * * 6 ] (a)(1)(A), (B). Under 29 C.F.R. 5
825.215(a) (2003), an equivalent position is "one that is virtually identical to the employee's
former position in terms of pay, benefits and working conditions, including [ * 2 0 ] privileges,
perquisites and status." The equivalency requirement does not extend to "de minimis or
intangible, unmeasurable aspects of the job." 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(f). As we stated
previously, Montgomery's complaints are based on these de minimis and unmeasurable parts
of her new assignment as compared with her old. The jobs are at the same pay grade and
increment level, her classification is the same, and she received a significant raise within two
months of the transfer.
Montgomery alleges that, under the notice pleading requirements of the federal system, her
complaint was adequate and she should not be held to any factual allegations in her
complaint. However, H / V 6 +under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a pleading must contain: (1) a short,
plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction; (2) a short, plain statement of the claim,
showing plaintiff is entitled to relief; and (3) "a demand for j u d g m e n t for the relief the
pleader seeks." Fed. [ * * 7 ] R._ Cjy. P. 8(a). Montgomery fails to show that she is entitled to
relief, and her demand for judgment does not seek relief that is recoverable under the Act.
Therefore, we conclude that dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, is appropriate.
Her allegation that the district court erred in denying her motion to amend also lacks m e r i t
7We review the district court's denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Deasy
y. H///,_833_F,2d 38, _40 (4th Cjr._ 1987). " " ^ M o n t g o m e r y failed to make a written motion to
amend in the district court; her sentence at the end of a memorandum opposing a motion to
dismiss does not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b), governing the form of
H/V7

motions. See Ramsgate Court Townhome Assoc, v. West Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157,
161 (3d Cir. 2002); Calderon v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Serv., 181 F.3d 1180,
1185-87 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the district court did not err in failing to act on such a
motion.
Accepting all Montgomery's allegations as true and making all inferences in her favor, it is
clear that she cannot prove [ * * 8 ] any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle
her to relief. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Therefore, although the district court erred in
dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted. We affirm the decision of the district court dismissing
her claim under the FMLA, for the reasons stated above. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
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